Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry

33 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2000 Last revised: 19 Aug 2010

See all articles by Paul L. Joskow

Paul L. Joskow

Alfred P. Sloan Foundation; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Nancy L. Rose

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Catherine D. Wolfram

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 1994

Abstract

This study explores the effect of regulatory and political constraints on the level of CEO compensation for 87 state-regulated electric utilities during 1978-1990. The results suggest that political pressures may constrain top executive pay levels in this industry. First, CEOs of firms operating in regulatory environments characterized by investment banks as relatively `pro-consumer' receive lower compensation than do CEOs of firms in environments ranked as more friendly to investors. Second, CEO pay is lower for utilities with relatively high or rising rates, or a higher proportion of industrial sales, consistent with earlier research that describes political pressures on electricity rates. Finally, attributes of the commission appointment and tenure rules affect CEO compensation in ways consistent with the political constraint hypothesis: for example, pay is lower in states with elected commissioners than in states where commissioners are appointed by the governor, all else equal. Despite apparently effective pressure to constrain pay levels in this sector, however, we find no evidence of related intra-industry variation in the sensitivity of pay to firm financial performance.

Suggested Citation

Joskow, Paul L. and Rose, Nancy L. and Wolfram, Catherine D., Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry (December 1994). NBER Working Paper No. w4980, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=226579

Paul L. Joskow (Contact Author)

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Nancy L. Rose

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Catherine D. Wolfram

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group ( email )

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