Managerial Ownership and Financial Analysts’ Information Environment

54 Pages Posted: 20 May 2013 Last revised: 19 Oct 2013

See all articles by Sam Han

Sam Han

Korea University Business School

Justin Yiqiang Jin

McMaster University - DeGroote School of Business

Tony Kang

University of Nebraska - Lincoln

Gerald J. Lobo

University of Houston - C.T. Bauer College of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 19, 2013

Abstract

Despite the importance of sell-side financial analysts as information intermediaries in the capital market, little is known about how managerial equity ownership associates with their information environment. Using Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens’ (1998) framework of measuring information precision, we observe that managerial ownership is positively associated with financial analysts’ public and private information precisions, largely consistent with the alignment view of managerial equity ownership. These results are robust to controlling for various economic and statistical factors that might affect the inference.

Keywords: Managerial Ownership, Information Environment, Incentive Alignment, Information Precision

JEL Classification: M40, M41, O16

Suggested Citation

Han, Sam and Jin, Justin Y. and Kang, Tony and Lobo, Gerald J., Managerial Ownership and Financial Analysts’ Information Environment (October 19, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267203 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2267203

Sam Han

Korea University Business School ( email )

Anam-Dong 5 Ga, Seongbuk-Gu
Seoul, 136-701
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)
+82-2-3290-2839 (Phone)

Justin Y. Jin

McMaster University - DeGroote School of Business ( email )

1280 Main Street West
Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4M4
Canada
905-525-9140 ext. 26194 (Phone)
905-521-8995 (Fax)

Tony Kang (Contact Author)

University of Nebraska - Lincoln ( email )

307 College of Business Administration
Lincoln, NE 68588-0488
United States

Gerald J. Lobo

University of Houston - C.T. Bauer College of Business ( email )

Houston, TX 77204-6021
United States
713-743-4838 (Phone)
713-743-4828 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.bauer.uh.edu/acct/acctprofile.asp?search=Gerald%20Lobo

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