Performance Volatility, Information Availability, and Disclosure Reforms
45 Pages Posted: 21 May 2013 Last revised: 28 Nov 2016
Date Written: September 28, 2016
Using the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley reform as an exogenous disclosure shock, we find that high, relative to low, volatility firms opt for lower levels of information availability pre reform and experience increases in information availability, CEO turnover-to-performance sensitivity, myopic behavior, CEO compensation with a structure tilted towards more cash pay, and a reduction in firm value post the reform. Our findings suggest that mandating high levels of information availability across the board increases managerial evaluation risk and produces additional agency costs for firms with volatile performance.
Keywords: Performance Volatility, Information Availability, Disclosure Reforms
JEL Classification: M40, M41, G38
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation