Political Instability and Economic Growth

49 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2000  

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Sule Ozler

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Nouriel Roubini

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Phillip Swagel

Northwestern University - Department of Economics; International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Date Written: September 1992

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950-1982. We define ?political instability? as the propensity of a government collapse, and we estimate a model in which political instability and economic growth are jointly determined. The main result of this paper is that in countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. This effect remains strong when we restrict our definition of ?government change? to cases of substantial changes of the government.

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Ozler, Sule and Roubini, Nouriel and Swagel, Phillip, Political Instability and Economic Growth (September 1992). NBER Working Paper No. w4173. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=226799

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Sule Ozler

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Nouriel Roubini

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Phillip Swagel

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

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Washington, DC 20431
United States
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(202) 623-6343 (Fax)

Northwestern University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Evanston, IL 60208
United States
(847) 491-8219 (Phone)

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