International Fiscal Policy Coordination and Competition: An Exposition

28 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2004

See all articles by Assaf Razin

Assaf Razin

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Efraim Sadka

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: July 1991

Abstract

The paper highlights key considerations necessary for the analysis of international tax competition and the desirability of international tax harmonization. The analysis of a Nash-Cournot international tax competition is carried out for (1) competing countries that cannot exercise significant market power in the world economy when setting tax rates, (2) competing countries that incorporate the indirect effect on world prices into the tax design and (3) competing governments that are unable to commit themselves to a preannounced path of tax for the entire future. The discussion is carried out by using basic principles of international taxation under full integration of goods and capital world markets.

Suggested Citation

Razin, Assaf and Sadka, Efraim, International Fiscal Policy Coordination and Competition: An Exposition (July 1991). NBER Working Paper No. w3779. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=226943

Assaf Razin (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 640 7303 (Phone)
+972 3 640 9908 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Efraim Sadka

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 640 9712 (Phone)
+972 3 642 8074 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
21
Abstract Views
713
PlumX Metrics