The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition

55 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2000 Last revised: 16 Aug 2010

See all articles by Patrick Rey

Patrick Rey

Toulouse School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Joseph E. Stiglitz

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: January 1994

Abstract

The central objective of this paper is to show how vertical restraints, which affect intra-brand competition, can and will be used as an effective mechanism for reducing inter-brand competition and increasing producer profits. We show how exclusive territories alter the perceived demand curve, making each producer believe he faces a less elastic demand curve, thereby inducing an increase of the equilibrium price. The use of exclusive territories may increase producers' profits, even if the producers cannot charge franchise fees, and so cannot recapture, from the retailers, the monopoly rents they earn from their exclusive territory: we show that 'double marginalization' effects can be overcome by the strategic effect on producers' competition. We provide a model in which we can clearly specify the full range of feasible contracts between producers and retailers, and show that it is always a dominant strategy for firms to use exclusive territories (so that exclusive territories are used in equilibrium) and that the best situation from the producers' viewpoint may or may not entail franchise fees. In all cases, exclusive territories hurt consumer surplus and reduce total welfare, which yields a different light on vertical restraints from a competition policy perspective.

Suggested Citation

Rey, Patrick and Stiglitz, Joseph E., The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition (January 1994). NBER Working Paper No. w4618. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=226977

Patrick Rey (Contact Author)

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

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France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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United Kingdom

Joseph E. Stiglitz

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.josephstiglitz.com

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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