The Political Economy of Capital Controls

38 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2004 Last revised: 2 Aug 2008

See all articles by Alberto F. Alesina

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Vittorio Grilli

Independent; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

International Monetary Fund (IMF); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: May 1993

Abstract

This paper calculates international income transfers which implement a Pareto optimal trade equilibrium in a world where many countries trade many goods.

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Grilli, Vittorio and Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, The Political Economy of Capital Controls (May 1993). NBER Working Paper No. w4353. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=227033

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
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617-495-8388 (Phone)
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Vittorio Grilli

Independent

Ministero del Tesoro
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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United States

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

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202-623-7441 (Phone)
202-589-7441 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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