State Mandated Benefits and Employer Provided Health Insurance

51 Pages Posted: 4 Jul 2004 Last revised: 3 Aug 2022

See all articles by Jonathan Gruber

Jonathan Gruber

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: December 1992

Abstract

One popular explanation for this low rate of employee coverage is the presence of numerous state regulations which mandate that group health insurance plans must include certain benefits. By raising the minimum costs of providing any health insurance coverage, these mandated benefits make it impossible for firms which would have desired to offer minimal health insurance at a low cost to do so. I use data on insurance coverage among employees in small firms to investigate whether this problem is an important cause of employee non-insurance. I find that mandates have little effect on the rate of insurance coverage; this finding is robust to a variety of specifications of the regulations. I also find that this lack of an effect may be because mandates are not binding, since most firms appear to offer these benefits even in the absence of regulation.

Suggested Citation

Gruber, Jonathan, State Mandated Benefits and Employer Provided Health Insurance (December 1992). NBER Working Paper No. w4239, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=227048

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