Antitrust and Competition in Health Care Markets

Gaynor, Martin; Vogt, William B.

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Antitrust and Competition in Health Care Markets

NBER Working Paper No. w7112

91 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2000 Last revised: 9 Dec 2022

See all articles by Martin Gaynor

Martin Gaynor

Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation

William B. Vogt

RAND Corporation; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

There are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 1999

Abstract

In this paper we review issues relating to antitrust and competition in health care markets. The paper begins with a brief review of antitrust legislation. We then discuss whether and how health care is different from other industries in ways that might affect the optimality of competition. The paper then focuses on the main areas in which antitrust has been applied to health care: hospital mergers, monopsony, and foreclosure. In each of these sections we review the relevant antitrust cases, discuss the issues that have arisen in those cases, and then review the relevant economics literature and suggest some new methods for analyzing these issues.

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Gaynor, Martin and Vogt, William B., Antitrust and Competition in Health Care Markets (May 1999). NBER Working Paper No. w7112, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=227336