Causes and Consequences of Corporate Asset Exchanges by Listed Companies in China

Abstract

China’s listed companies often exchange corporate assets with unlisted affiliates, such as their parent companies, which is rarely observed in the United States. We find that listed companies that have been incompletely restructured from former state-owned enterprises and those that are in sound financial condition tend to exchange higher quality assets for lower quality assets (i.e., tunneling). However, when there is a need to avoid reporting a loss and to raise additional capital, listed companies tend to exchange lower quality assets for higher quality assets (i.e., propping). We also find that the market reacts indifferently to asset exchange announcements. Finally, we find asset exchanges motivated by a tunneling (propping) incentive to be associated with poorer (improved) post-exchange stock performance and financial performance. In summary, this study contributes to the corporate assets literature by providing two new incentives: tunneling and propping.

Keywords: Assets exchange, Tunneling, Propping

JEL Classification: G14, G15, G34