Salience, Coordination and Cooperation in Contributing to Threshold Public Goods

27 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2013

See all articles by Luca Corazzini

Luca Corazzini

University of Padua - Department of Economics; Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Christopher Cotton

Queen's University, Department of Economics

Paola Valbonesi

University of Padua - Department of Economics and Management, DSEA

Date Written: May 2012

Abstract

We present results from a multiple public goods experiment, where each public good produces benefits only if total contributions to it reach a minimum threshold. The experiment allows us to compare a subject's behavior in a benchmark treatment with a single public good and in treatments with more public goods than can be funded. We show how the availability of additional, more efficient public goods may not make subjects better off. This is because additional options decrease the probability of coordination and discourage contributions. Introducing additional, less-efficient options does not alter coordination and contributions relative to the benchmark.

Keywords: threshold public goods, multiple public goods, salience, efficiency, laboratory experiment

JEL Classification: C91, C92, H40, H41

Suggested Citation

Corazzini, Luca and Cotton, Christopher and Valbonesi, Paola, Salience, Coordination and Cooperation in Contributing to Threshold Public Goods (May 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2274196 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2274196

Luca Corazzini

University of Padua - Department of Economics ( email )

via Del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Christopher Cotton (Contact Author)

Queen's University, Department of Economics ( email )

Dunning Hall 230
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.christophercotton.ca

Paola Valbonesi

University of Padua - Department of Economics and Management, DSEA ( email )

via Del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy
+39+049+8274058 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.decon.unipd.it

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