Competitiveness in Dynamic Group Contests: Evidence from Combined Field and Lab Data

Gutenberg School of Management and Economics Discussion Paper No. 1303

31 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2013 Last revised: 14 Jun 2013

See all articles by Yann Girard

Yann Girard

Goethe University Frankfurt - Graduate School of Economics, Finance and Management (GSEFM)

Florian Hett

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Management and Applied Microeconomics

Date Written: May 5, 2013

Abstract

We analyse data from a field setting in which students participate in a dynamic group contest with feedback. We combine this information with a laboratory measure of competitiveness. We find that competitive groups perform worse overall. In addition, we find that participants react to intermediate performance: A better rank in a given period increases the number of points in the subsequent period, even after controlling for group and time fixed effects. The effect is significantly stronger for competitive groups. We show that this difference in the sensitivity to dynamic incentives can explain the overall negative effect of competitiveness on performance.

Keywords: Dynamic contest, competitiveness, field experiments, lab experiments, rank feedback

JEL Classification: C91, C93, D03, D74, I21

Suggested Citation

Girard, Yann and Hett, Florian, Competitiveness in Dynamic Group Contests: Evidence from Combined Field and Lab Data (May 5, 2013). Gutenberg School of Management and Economics Discussion Paper No. 1303 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2274235 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2274235

Yann Girard

Goethe University Frankfurt - Graduate School of Economics, Finance and Management (GSEFM) ( email )

House of Finance
Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Florian Hett (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Management and Applied Microeconomics ( email )

Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
49
Abstract Views
379
PlumX Metrics