Learning More by Doing Less: Capacity and Competition in Bayesian Persuasion

51 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2013

See all articles by Raphael Boleslavsky

Raphael Boleslavsky

University of Miami - School of Business Administration - Department of Economics

Christopher Cotton

Queen's University, Department of Economics

Date Written: February 19, 2013

Abstract

Self-interested agents produce information in an attempt to convince a principal to act on their behalf. Agents provide less informative evidence than the principal prefers since doing so maximizes the probability the principal acts in their favor. If the principal faces constraints that limit the number of agents whose proposals she can support, then agents produce more-accurate evidence as they compete for priority. Under reasonable conditions, the principal is better off when her capacity to act is limited.

Keywords: strategic search, evidence production, persuasion, lobbying

JEL Classification: D72, D78, D83, L15

Suggested Citation

Boleslavsky, Raphael and Cotton, Christopher, Learning More by Doing Less: Capacity and Competition in Bayesian Persuasion (February 19, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2274266 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2274266

Raphael Boleslavsky

University of Miami - School of Business Administration - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 248126
Coral Gables, FL 33124-6550
United States

Christopher Cotton (Contact Author)

Queen's University, Department of Economics ( email )

Dunning Hall 230
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.christophercotton.ca

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