Do Higher Government Wages Reduce Corruption? Evidence Based on a Novel Dataset

29 Pages Posted: 6 Jun 2013

See all articles by Van-Ha Le

Van-Ha Le

University of Groningen

Jakob de Haan

University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business; De Nederlandsche Bank; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Erik Dietzenbacher

University of Groningen - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 31, 2013

Abstract

This paper employs a novel dataset on government wages to investigate the relationship between government remuneration policy and corruption. Our dataset, as derived from national household or labor surveys, is more reliable than the data on government wages as used in previous research. When the relationship between government wages and corruption is modeled to vary with the level of income, we find that the impact of government wages on corruption is strong at relatively low-income levels.

Keywords: corruption, government wages, government pay policy, efficiency wages

JEL Classification: J380, J410, J450, O570

Suggested Citation

Le, Van-Ha and de Haan, Jakob and Dietzenbacher, Erik, Do Higher Government Wages Reduce Corruption? Evidence Based on a Novel Dataset (May 31, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4254. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2274648

Van-Ha Le

University of Groningen ( email )

P.O. Box 800
9700 AH Groningen, Groningen 9700 AV
Netherlands

Jakob de Haan (Contact Author)

University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business ( email )

PO Box 800
Groningen, 9700 AV
Netherlands
+31 0 50 3633706 (Fax)

De Nederlandsche Bank ( email )

P.O. Box 98
Amsterdam, 1000 AB
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Erik Dietzenbacher

University of Groningen - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 800
9700 AV Groningen
Netherlands
+31 (0)50 3633813 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
280
rank
106,017
Abstract Views
1,405
PlumX Metrics