Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems

45 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2004

See all articles by Joel B. Slemrod

Joel B. Slemrod

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: July 1989

Abstract

The theory of optimal taxation has , for the pas two decades , been the reigning normative approach of taxation. This paper argues that , in its current state, optimal tax theory is incomplete as a guide to action concerning many critical issues in tax policy. It is incomplete because it has not yet come to terms with taxation as a system of coercively collecting revenues from individuals who will tend to resist. The coercive nature of collection taxes implies that the resource cost of implementing a tax system have been and will continue to be a critical determinant of appropriate tax policy. The paper first presents the three cornerstone propositions of optimal tax theory, and then it discusses the influence of these propositions on recent tax policy developments. It concludes by sketching an alternative to optimal taxation, called the theory of optimal tax systems, which embraces the insights of optimal taxation but also considers the technology of raising taxes and the constraints placed upon tax policy by that technology. The optimal tax systems perspective is shown to shed light on the choice of tax instruments, the problem of tax evasion, and the appropriate tax treatment of capital income.

Suggested Citation

Slemrod, Joel B., Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems (July 1989). NBER Working Paper No. w3038. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=227478

Joel B. Slemrod (Contact Author)

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Room R5396
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States
734-936-3914 (Phone)
734-763-4032 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
142
Abstract Views
2,219
rank
203,144
PlumX Metrics