Political Parties and Election Fraud

43 Pages Posted: 6 Jun 2013 Last revised: 25 Sep 2013

Date Written: September 24, 2013


Autocrats face a dilemma. Continue with fraudulent electoral practices and risk revolt, or reduce fraud and risk losing elections. One solution is to structure electoral governance such that it allows for independence and professionalism at the center, lending credibility to the electoral process, and partisan local-level administration, enabling fraud at the micro level. Partisan poll workers can help deliver the vote by the use of ‘smart fraud’ – fraud that minimizes the risk of being caught and is used only when needed. In Armenia, the ruling party’s vote share, as a proportion of all registered voters, increases with 8.2 percent in polling stations where the chairperson was randomly assigned to the ruling party. Fraud forensics suggests that one of the mechanisms behind this was falsification of the results protocol during the count. I conjecture that fraud is only used in high-stakes elections and that election observers are unable to detect it.

Keywords: Principal-Agent Theory, Election Fraud, Electoral Administration, Experiments

JEL Classification: C93, D72, D73

Suggested Citation

Sjoberg, Fredrik, Political Parties and Election Fraud (September 24, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2274873 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2274873

Fredrik Sjoberg (Contact Author)

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics