Systemic Risk and Central Clearing Counterparty Design

46 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2013 Last revised: 1 Mar 2017

See all articles by Hamed Amini

Hamed Amini

University of Florida

Damir Filipović

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute

Andreea Minca

Cornell University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 3, 2015


We examine the effects on a financial network of multilateral clearing via a central clearing counterparty (CCP) from an ex ante and ex post perspective. The CCP is capitalized with equity and a guarantee fund and it can charge a volume-based fee. We propose a CCP design which improves aggregate surplus, and reduces banks' liquidation and shortfall losses. We characterize the CCP's equity, fee and guarantee fund policies that reduce systemic risk and are incentive compatible for banks. A simulation study based on aggregate market data shows that central counterparty clearing can reduce systemic risk and improve banks' utility.

Keywords: Over the Counter Markets, Central Counterparty Clearing, Market Design, Financial Network, Contagion, Systemic Risk, Credit Default Swap Markets

JEL Classification: C44, C54, C62, G01, G18, G32

Suggested Citation

Amini, Hamed and Filipovic, Damir and Minca, Andreea, Systemic Risk and Central Clearing Counterparty Design (September 3, 2015). Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 13-34, Available at SSRN: or

Hamed Amini

University of Florida ( email )

University of Florida
Gainesville, FL 32611
United States

Damir Filipovic (Contact Author)

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )

Station 5
Lausanne, 1015


Swiss Finance Institute

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4

Andreea Minca

Cornell University ( email )

222 Rhodes Hall
Ithaca, NY NY 14853
United States


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