Union Success in Representation Elections: Why Does Unit Size Matter?

44 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2000 Last revised: 3 Oct 2020

See all articles by Henry S. Farber

Henry S. Farber

Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 1999

Abstract

I establish four facts regarding the pattern of NLRB supervised representation election activity over the past 45 years: 1) the quantity of election activity has fallen sharply and discontinuously since the mid-70's after increasing between the mid-1950's and the mid-1970's; 2) union success in elections held has declined less sharply, though continuously, over the entire period; 3) it has always been the case that unions have been less likely to win NLRB-supervised representation elections in large units than in small units; and 4) the size-gap in union success rates has widened substantially over the last forty years. I develop a simple optimizing model of the union decision to hold a representation election that can account for the first three facts. I provide a pair of competing explanations for the fourth fact: one based on differential behavior by employers of different sizes and one purely statistical. I then develop and estimate three empirical models of election outcomes using data on NLRB elections over the 1952-98 time period in order to determine whether the simple statistical model can account for the size pattern of union win rates over time. I conclude that systematic union selection of targets for organization combined with the purely statistical factors can largely account for observed patterns.

Suggested Citation

Farber, Henry S., Union Success in Representation Elections: Why Does Unit Size Matter? (July 1999). NBER Working Paper No. w7229, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=227563

Henry S. Farber (Contact Author)

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