Meritocracy, Egalitarianism and the Stability of Majoritarian Organizations

44 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2013 Last revised: 24 Feb 2015

See all articles by Salvador Barberà

Salvador Barberà

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; MOVE; Barcelona GSE

Carmen Bevia

Universidad de Alicante

Clara Ponsati

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History

Date Written: February 22, 2015

Abstract

Egalitarianism and meritocracy are competing principles to distribute the joint benefits of cooperation. We examine the consequences of letting members of society vote between those two principles, in a context where individuals must joint with others into coalitions of a certain size to become productive. Our setup induces a hedonic game of coalition formation. We study the existence of core stable partitions (organizational structures) of this game. We show that the inability of voters to commit to one distributional rule or another is a potential source of instability. But we also prove that, when stable organizational structures exist, they may be rich in form, and different than those predicted by alternative models of coalition formation. Non-segregated coalitions may arise within core stable structures. Stability is also compatible with the coexistence of meritocratic and egalitarian coalitions. These phenomena are robust, and persist under alternative variants of our initial model.

Keywords: Egalitarianism, Meritocracy, Coalition Formation, Hedonic Games, Core Stability, Assortative Mating

JEL Classification: C62, C71, D02, D71

Suggested Citation

Barberà, Salvador and Bevia, Carmen and Ponsati, Clara, Meritocracy, Egalitarianism and the Stability of Majoritarian Organizations (February 22, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2275851 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2275851

Salvador Barberà (Contact Author)

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Cerdanyola del Vallès, Barcelolna 08193
Spain
34935811814 (Phone)
34935812012 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://pareto.uab.es/sbarbera/

MOVE ( email )

Campus de Bellaterra-UAB Edifici B (s/n)
EDIFICI B
Cerdanyola del Vallès
, Barcelona 08193
Spain
34935812188 (Phone)
34935812012 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.movebarcelona.eu/

Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Catalonia 08014
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://barcelonagse.eu/

Carmen Bevia

Universidad de Alicante ( email )

Campus de San Vicente, sn
Alicante, 03690
Spain

Clara Ponsati

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain

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