Note on Risk Aversion and Sharing of Firm-Specific Information in Duopolies

The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 41, No. 1, Mar., 1993

University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2013-659

Posted: 28 Jun 2013

Date Written: March 1, 1992

Abstract

This note extends earlier work on the effects of risk aversion on the preferences of duopolists to share information. It is shown that the common finding that Cournot duopolists prefer to share firm-specific information no longer obtains for some parameterizations. In particular, the greater the aversion to risk, the larger the parameter regions in which not sharing information is preferred.

Suggested Citation

Kao, Jennifer L. and Hughes, John, Note on Risk Aversion and Sharing of Firm-Specific Information in Duopolies (March 1, 1992). The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 41, No. 1, Mar., 1993, University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2013-659, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2276000

John Hughes

Independent ( email )

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