Two Cheers for Instant Runoff Voting

Abstract

In multi-candidate elections, an unpopular candidate can often win with a minority of the vote if his or her opponents split their votes among several candidates. To solve this problem, some commentators have endorsed instant runoff voting (IRV). Under IRV, voters rank their choices, and the choices of the weaker candidates would be distributed among the leaders. As a result, a candidate who has a plurality of votes but is opposed by the majority of the electorate would be less likely to prevail.

Most law-related scholarship on IRV has either strongly endorsed or strongly opposed IRV. This article, by contrast, generally endorses IRV but concludes that IRV has been somewhat oversold. Some IRV supporters claim that IRV will enhance voter satisfaction with elections and reduce negative campaigning; there is little evidence that either has occurred in places that (like Australia) have adopted IRV. The article then criticizes a variety of arguments made by IRV opponents.

Keywords: instant runoff voting, elections