School Accountability: Can We Reward Schools and Avoid Pupil Selection?

38 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2013

See all articles by Erwin Ooghe

Erwin Ooghe

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies

Erik Schokkaert

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL)

Abstract

School accountability schemes require measures of school performance, and these measures are in practice often based on pupil test scores. It is well-known that insufficiently correcting these test scores for pupil characteristics may provide incentives for inefficient pupil selection. We show that the trade-off between reward and pupil selection is not only a matter of sufficient information. A school accountability scheme that rewards school performance will create incentives for pupil selection, even under perfect information, unless the educational production function satisfies an (unrealistic) separability assumption. We propose different compromise solutions and discuss the resulting incentives in theory. The empirical relevance of our analysis – i.e., the rejection of the separability assumption and the magnitude of the incentives in the different compromise solutions – is illustrated with Flemish data.

Keywords: school accountability, cream-skimming, educational production function

JEL Classification: H52, I22, I24

Suggested Citation

Ooghe, Erwin and Schokkaert, Erik, School Accountability: Can We Reward Schools and Avoid Pupil Selection?. IZA Discussion Paper No. 7420, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2276312

Erwin Ooghe (Contact Author)

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Erik Schokkaert

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
15
Abstract Views
226
PlumX Metrics