Against Being Against the Revolving Door

David T. Zaring

University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department

June 13, 2013

University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2013, No. 2, 2013

The revolving door between jobs in the public and private sector supposedly incentivizes government regulators to regulate on behalf of the industry interests for whom they will eventually work. It is a critical building block of the critique of government solutions to modern problems, and has, in the last two years, been the subject of one of the Obama administration’s first executive orders, made an appearance in financial regulatory reform legislation, and been blamed for the government’s failure to prevent the Gulf oil spill.

But the revolving door’s explanatory power is remarkably overstated, especially when the subject is law enforcement. Most government officials have plenty of reasons to do a good job, and sometimes a successful stint in the public sector enhances private sector earning potential, to say nothing of more immediate civil service prospects. The revolving door may also foster citizen participation in government. A study of the careers of a tranche of elite Manhattan prosecutors does not reveal any evidence of those who leave doing the bidding of those they regulate while in public service.

Moreover, as a legal matter, eliminating the revolving door would raise serious legal and even constitutional questions. The revolving door has become an overused shorthand for – at its worst – a toxic cynicism about government. It is time to deeply qualify the critique.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

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Date posted: June 15, 2013 ; Last revised: June 19, 2013

Suggested Citation

Zaring, David T., Against Being Against the Revolving Door (June 13, 2013). University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2013, No. 2, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2279015

Contact Information

David T. Zaring (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department ( email )
3730 Walnut Street
Suite 600
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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