Crowdfunding Securities

Andrew A. Schwartz

University of Colorado Law School

June 13, 2013

Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 88, 1457, 2013
U of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-9

A new federal statute authorizes the online "crowdfunding" of securities, a new idea based on the concept of "reward" crowdfunding practiced on Kickstarter and other websites. This method of selling securities had previously been banned by federal securities law but the new CROWDFUND Act overturns that prohibition.

This Article introduces the CROWDFUND Act and explains that it can be expected to have two primary effects on securities law and capital markets. First, it will liberate startup companies to use peer networks and the Internet to obtain modest amounts of capital at low cost. Second, it will help democratize the market for financing speculative startup companies and allow investors of modest means to make investments that had previously been offered solely to wealthy, so-called “accredited” investors.

This Article also offers two predictions as to how securities crowdfunding will play out in practice. First, it predicts that companies that sell equity via crowdfunding may find themselves the subject of hostile takeovers (though the founders of such companies can easily avoid that outcome if they act with a little foresight). Second, it predicts that issuers may prefer to crowdfund debt securities, such as bonds, rather than equity. The Article concludes with a few thoughts on the SEC’s implementation of the Act in light of the potential for fraud.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Crowdfunding, Securities, JOBS Act, CROWDFUND Act, SEC, Debt, Takeovers, Financing, Bonds, Startup, Kickstarter, Accredited Investor

JEL Classification: K00, K2, K20, K22, K23, O16, O3, O38, O40

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Date posted: June 14, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Schwartz, Andrew A., Crowdfunding Securities (June 13, 2013). Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 88, 1457, 2013; U of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-9. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2279175

Contact Information

Andrew A. Schwartz (Contact Author)
University of Colorado Law School ( email )
401 UCB
Boulder, CO 80309
United States

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