GM-Free Private Sandards, Public Regulation of GM Products and Mass Media

37 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2013

See all articles by Mauro Vigani

Mauro Vigani

University of Gloucestershire

Alessandro Olper

Università degli Studi di Milano; KU Leuven - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance (LICOS)

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

This paper provides evidence on private standards on genetically modified (GM) organisms for 44 retailers operating in 54 countries, distinguishing between retailers not using GM ingredients, and retailers using ingredients which are potentially GM in private label products. Using this information, we empirically investigate the drivers that induce retailers to adopting a GM-free private standard. The results show that many of the drivers highlighted in the literature, such as historical factors, communication infrastructure and sectoral conditions affect the likelihood of adopting a private standard. Moreover, we tested additional hypotheses from the political economy of standard formation and of mass media. Key results show that a higher share of public media reduces the probability of adopting GM-free private standards, while a higher heterogeneity in the GMO public standards increase this probability.

Keywords: GM-free private standards, vertical differentiation, political economics, media market

JEL Classification: D72, Q13, Q16, Q18

Suggested Citation

Vigani, Mauro and Olper, Alessandro, GM-Free Private Sandards, Public Regulation of GM Products and Mass Media (2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2280395 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2280395

Mauro Vigani (Contact Author)

University of Gloucestershire ( email )

Oxstalls Lane
The Park
Gloucester GL2 9HW, Gloucestershire GL50 2RH
United Kingdom

Alessandro Olper

Università degli Studi di Milano ( email )

Via Celoria, 2
Milano, 20133
Italy
+390250316481 (Phone)
+390250316486 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://users.unimi.it/olper/

KU Leuven - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance (LICOS) ( email )

Waaistraat 6 - box 3511
Leuven, 3000
Belgium

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