Performance Benefits of Tight Control

Posted: 22 May 2019

See all articles by Andrej Gill

Andrej Gill

Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz

Nikolai Visnjic

Goethe University Frankfurt

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 18, 2013


This study investigates the transition from being a listed company with a dispersed ownership structure to being a privately held company with a concentrated ownership structure. We consider a sample of private equity backed portfolio companies to evaluate the consequences of the corporate governance changes on operational performance. Our analysis shows significant positive abnormal growth in several performance ratios for the private period of our sample companies relative to comparable public companies. These performance differences come from the increase in ownership concentration after the leveraged buyout transaction.

Keywords: private equity, leveraged buyouts, active shareholders, ownership concentration, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G23, G24, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Gill, Andrej and Visnjic, Nikolai, Performance Benefits of Tight Control (June 18, 2013). SAFE Working Paper No. 24,, Available at SSRN: or

Andrej Gill (Contact Author)

Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz ( email )

Saarstr. 21
Jakob Welder-Weg 4
Mainz, 55122

Nikolai Visnjic

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323

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