Cognition in Spatial Dispersion Games

Experimental Business Research, 2005, pp. 185-202

University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2013-1067

Posted: 2 Jul 2013

See all articles by Andreas Blume

Andreas Blume

University of Pittsburgh - Department of Economics

Douglas V. DeJong

University of Iowa - Tippie College of Business

Michael S. Maier

University of Alberta - Alberta School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1, 2004

Abstract

In common-interest spatial-dispersion games the agents’ common goal is to choose distinct locations. We experimentally investigate the role of cognition in such games and compare it with the role of cognition in spatial matching games. In our setup cognition matters because agents may be differentially aware of the dispersion opportunities that are created by the history of the game. We ask whether cognitive constraints limit the agents’ ability to achieve dispersion and, if there is dispersion, whether these constraints affect the mode by which agents achieve dispersion. Our main finding is that strategic interaction magnifies the role of cognitive constraints. Specifically, with cognitive constraints, pairs of agents fail to solve a dispersion problem that poses little or no problem for individual agents playing against themselves. When we remove the cognitive constraints in our design, pairs of agents solve the same problem just as well as individuals do. In addition, we find that when playing against themselves agents do not change the mode by which they solve the dispersion problem when our design removes the cognitive constraints.

Suggested Citation

Blume, Andreas and DeJong, Douglas V. and Maier, Michael, Cognition in Spatial Dispersion Games (June 1, 2004). Experimental Business Research, 2005, pp. 185-202, University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2013-1067, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2281397

Andreas Blume (Contact Author)

University of Pittsburgh - Department of Economics ( email )

4901 Wesley Posvar Hall
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Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States

Douglas V. DeJong

University of Iowa - Tippie College of Business ( email )

108 Pappajohn Business Building
Iowa City, IA 52242-1000
United States
319-335-0919 (Phone)

Michael Maier

University of Alberta - Alberta School of Business ( email )

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Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
7802481275 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://business.ualberta.ca/about/contact-us/school-directory/michael-maier

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