Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience

54 Pages Posted: 18 May 2000 Last revised: 17 Oct 2010

See all articles by Francois Degeorge

Francois Degeorge

University of Lugano - Faculty of Economics; Swiss Finance Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Dirk Jenter

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Alberto Moel

Monitor Corporate Finance, Monitor Group

Peter Tufano

University of Oxford - Said Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Oxford - Said Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2000

Abstract

In 1997, France T‚l‚com, the state-owned French telephone company, went through a partial privatization. The government offered current and prior France T‚l‚com employees the opportunity to buy portfolios of shares with various combinations of discounts, required holding periods, leverage, tax treatment, and levels of downside protection. We adapt a neoclassical model of investment decision-making that takes into account firm-specific human capital and holding period restrictions to predict how employees might respond to the share offers. Using a database that tracks over 200,000 eligible participants, we analyze the employees' characteristics and their decisions whether to participate; how much to invest; and what form of stock alternatives they selected.

Suggested Citation

Degeorge, Francois and Jenter, Dirk and Moel, Alberto and Tufano, Peter, Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience (May 2000). NBER Working Paper No. w7683. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=228156

Francois Degeorge (Contact Author)

University of Lugano - Faculty of Economics ( email )

via Giuseppe Buffi 13
CH-6904 Lugano
Switzerland
41 58 666 4634 (Phone)
41 58 666 4647 (Fax)

Swiss Finance Institute

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Dirk Jenter

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance ( email )

United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/jenter/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Alberto Moel

Monitor Corporate Finance, Monitor Group ( email )

Two Canal Park
Cambridge, MA 02141
United States

Peter Tufano

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 (0) 1865 288551 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 (0) 1865 288551 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
37
Abstract Views
2,585
PlumX Metrics