63 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2013
Date Written: June 19, 2013
The growth of private-equity investment strategies in which firms often hold partial ownership interests in competing firms has led competition agencies to take an increased interest in assessing the competitive effects of partial horizontal acquisitions. We propose a methodology to evaluate the coordinated effects of such acquisitions on differentiated products industries. The acquisitions may be direct and indirect, and may or not correspond to control. The methodology, that nests full mergers, evaluates the impact on the range of discount factors for which coordination can be sustained. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.
Keywords: Antitrust, Coordinated Effects, Partial Acquisitions, Oligopoly, Differentiated Products, Demand Estimation
JEL Classification: D12, C54, L13, L41, L66
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Brito, Duarte and Ribeiro, Ricardo and Vasconcelos, Helder, Quantifying the Coordinated Effects of Partial Horizontal Acquisitions (June 19, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2282126 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2282126