Download This PaperShotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem
31 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2013 Last revised: 20 Sep 2013
Date Written: September 20, 2013
Abstract
Shotguns clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of offeror typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unfair and inefficient outcomes occur with an unassigned offeror. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.
Keywords: Business Deadlock, Shotgun Mechanisms, Asymmetric Information, Experiments
JEL Classification: K40, C72, C90, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Landeo, Claudia M. and Spier, Kathryn E., Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem (September 20, 2013). Economics Letters, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2282204 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2282204
Kathryn E. Spier (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Law School - Faculty ( email )
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