Economic Engineering and the Design of Matching Markets: The Contributions of Alvin E. Roth

21 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2013

See all articles by Matthew O. Jackson

Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)

Date Written: July 2013


Alvin Roth's research on, and design of, new economic systems has had a wide and large impact on human welfare, from the matching of residents to medical programs, to the assignment of students to schools, to the manner in which kidneys are allocated to patients needing transplants. This article discusses his important contributions to the understanding and improvement of matching markets, highlighting Roth's key roles in some of the most prominent successes of market design and the ascension of economic engineering.

Keywords: Assignment, kidney exchange, market design, matching, school choice

JEL Classification: D47, C78, D61, D78, I10, I20

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Matthew O., Economic Engineering and the Design of Matching Markets: The Contributions of Alvin E. Roth (July 2013). The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, Issue 3, pp. 619-639, 2013. Available at SSRN: or

Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)


Santa Fe Institute

1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States

Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) ( email )

180 Dundas Street West, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario

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