Legislative Delegation, the Unitary Presidency, and the Legitimacy of the Administrative State

10 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2013  

Peter M. Shane

Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

This essay focuses on the relationship between nondelegation doctrine and so-called unitary executive theory. It argues that, if the Supreme Court were to embrace unitary executive theory without, as is highly unlikely, tightening up on the nondelegation doctrine, the result would be a constitutional disaster in terms of reduced executive branch legal and political accountability. Increasing the legitimacy of the administrative state ought to involve more, not fewer mechanisms that subject the exercise of presidential power to effective checks and balances.

Keywords: delegation, administrative law, presidency, executive power, unitary executive, checks and balances

JEL Classification: K1, K23

Suggested Citation

Shane, Peter M., Legislative Delegation, the Unitary Presidency, and the Legitimacy of the Administrative State (2010). Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 103-110; Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 216. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2284293

Peter M. Shane (Contact Author)

Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law ( email )

55 West 12th Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210
United States

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