Introducing The Climate Credit Mechanism

25 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2013 Last revised: 3 Jul 2013

See all articles by Daniel Alexandre Bloch

Daniel Alexandre Bloch

Université Paris VI Pierre et Marie Curie

Date Written: June 25, 2013

Abstract

The principal index of climate change that may result from increased atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide is the increase in global mean temperature. Internalising the climate variable, we revisit the existing schemes for fighting global warming and propose a positive action mechanism by introducing the Climate Credit Mechanism based on governments, regions or municipalities allotting tradable rewards not to pollute to local green projects and companies reducing their GHG emissions. While the carbon trading mechanism is a political global scheme focusing only on polluters, we provide incentives for not polluting through a viable local financial mechanism where local capital matches local interests. We illustrate the mechanism by showing how local governments could allot Climate Credits to long term investors in exchange for capital in the form of a state bond, in view of developing the renewable energies. Similarly, we show how local governments could allot Climate Credits to the land owners in order to preserve lands from being improperly hydraulically fractured in view of extracting shale gas. By supplying Climate Credits to land owners, local government directly supports water and health quality in the state, while promoting the development of renewable energies.

Keywords: Global Mean Temperature, Climate Change, Climate Credit Mechanism, Positive Action Mechanism, Options

Suggested Citation

Bloch, Daniel Alexandre, Introducing The Climate Credit Mechanism (June 25, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2284906 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2284906

Daniel Alexandre Bloch (Contact Author)

Université Paris VI Pierre et Marie Curie ( email )

175 Rue du Chevaleret
Paris, 75013
France

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