A Model of Expertise

Posted: 11 Sep 2000

See all articles by Vijay Krishna

Vijay Krishna

Penn State University

John Morgan

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

We study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single expert, the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker. We ask whether this situation is improved by having the decision maker sequentially consult two experts. We first show that there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which full revelation occurs. When both experts are biased in the same direction, it is never beneficial to consult both. In contrast, when experts are biased in opposite directions, it is always beneficial to consult both. Indeed, in this case full revelation may be induced in an extended debate by introducing the possibility of rebuttal.

JEL Classification: D80

Suggested Citation

Krishna, Vijay and Morgan, John, A Model of Expertise. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, No. 2, 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=228531

Vijay Krishna (Contact Author)

Penn State University ( email )

Kern 516
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814-863-8543 (Phone)
814-863-4775 (Fax)

John Morgan

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-2669 (Phone)
810-885-5959 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/

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