The Arms Trade Game: From Laissez-Faire to a Common Defence Policy

Posted: 30 Jul 2000

See all articles by Paul Levine

Paul Levine

School of Economics, University of Surrey

Ron Smith

Birkbeck College

Abstract

Multinational arms export control has been the subject of discussion in a variety of fora, from the United Nations through to the Wassenaar group of arms producers. It is widely recognised that free trade in arms can have negative externalities on national security and there are benefits from the international coordination of controls. However, there has been relatively little economic analysis of these issues, partly because the market for arms is somewhat unusual. This paper develops a partial equilibrium model of the international arms market and compares a variety of possible regimes from laissez-faire at one extreme, to a common defence policy at the other.

JEL Classification: F14

Suggested Citation

Levine, Paul L. and Smith, Ron P., The Arms Trade Game: From Laissez-Faire to a Common Defence Policy. Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 52, Issue 2, pp. 357-380. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=228564

Paul L. Levine (Contact Author)

School of Economics, University of Surrey ( email )

Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH
United Kingdom
+44 1483 259 380 Ext. 2773 (Phone)
+44 1483 259 548 (Fax)

Ron P. Smith

Birkbeck College ( email )

Malet Street
London WC1E 7HX
United Kingdom
+44 207 631 6413 (Phone)
+44 207 631 6416 (Fax)

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