A Public Strategy for Compliance Monitoring

36 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Varun Gauri

Varun Gauri

World Bank; World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Jeffrey K. Staton

Emory University - Department of Political Science; University of Gothenburg - V-Dem Institute

Jorge Vargas Cullell

Programa Estado de la Nación

Date Written: June 1, 2013

Abstract

Theoretical accounts of compliance with court orders emphasize the importance of transparency. Most empirical studies of compliance center on high profile political cases, largely ignoring the high-volume, quotidian claims against the state for basic services that constitute the largest share of court dockets in many jurisdictions. This paper uses a unique dataset on compliance with orders from the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica to examine the determinants of compliance in low salience cases. It finds that orders issued just after the Court announced, in a press conference, that it was monitoring compliance were implemented roughly two months sooner than orders issued just prior to the press conference. These findings suggest that publicity can motivate compliance even in low salience cases.

Keywords: Environmental Governance, Administrative & Regulatory Law, Brown Issues and Health, Children and Youth, Social Protections & Assistance

Suggested Citation

Gauri, Varun and Staton, Jeffrey K. and Cullell, Jorge Vargas, A Public Strategy for Compliance Monitoring (June 1, 2013). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6523, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2287056

Varun Gauri (Contact Author)

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/vgauri

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Jeffrey K. Staton

Emory University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-727-6559 (Phone)
404-727-4586 (Fax)

University of Gothenburg - V-Dem Institute ( email )

United States

Jorge Vargas Cullell

Programa Estado de la Nación ( email )

San Jose
Costa Rica

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