Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union: Improving Compliance Effectively?

Journal of European Public Policy (2013)

30 Pages Posted: 4 Jul 2013 Last revised: 7 Aug 2013

See all articles by Mogens Hobolth

Mogens Hobolth

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - European Institute

Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen

University of Copenhagen - Department of Political Science

Date Written: July 1, 2013

Abstract

The application of European Union (EU) rules is, in general, the responsibility of national executives. This key intergovernmental aspect of the EU’s administrative order makes compliance with supranational law vulnerable to distortion. However, the European executive has added important fire-alarm oversight mechanisms by means of transgovernmental networks (TGNs) to its toolbox. This article examines the work mode, horizontalness and effectiveness of such networks as newer governance tools to oversee and monitor the compliance with EU law. It draws on a unique dataset on the Solvit network, enabling us to examine effectiveness and variation of a transgovernmental network in operation.

The article substantiates the relevance of TGNs in identifying and solving manifold and complex problems of misapplied EU law, finds that the Commission constitutes a focal point in this type of multilevel executive and points out that learning in part explains why effectiveness varies across member states.

Keywords: Compliance, effectiveness, internal market, multilevel executive, transgovernmental networks

Suggested Citation

Hobolth, Mogens and Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg, Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union: Improving Compliance Effectively? (July 1, 2013). Journal of European Public Policy (2013), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2287935

Mogens Hobolth

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - European Institute ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen (Contact Author)

University of Copenhagen - Department of Political Science ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Copenhagen
Denmark
+45 3532 3426 (Phone)

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