An Argument in Favor of Long Terms for Central Bankers

12 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2013

Date Written: July 1, 2013

Abstract

We draw on the canonical New Keynesian model to assess the consequences of the central bankers’ term length for the government’s appointment decision. We show that longer terms induce the government to appoint more conservative central bankers, which is conducive to welfare.

Keywords: term length, conservative central banker, New Keynesian model

JEL Classification: E58

Suggested Citation

Hahn, Volker, An Argument in Favor of Long Terms for Central Bankers (July 1, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2289092 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2289092

Volker Hahn (Contact Author)

University of Konstanz ( email )

Box 143
Konstanz, 78457
Germany

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