Committee Design with Endogenous Participation

45 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2013 Last revised: 25 Feb 2016

Date Written: January 1, 2016

Abstract

We analyze different committee designs in a model with the endogenous participation of experts who have private information about their own abilities. Each committee design involves a test of abilities whose accuracy influences experts’ decisions to participate. We derive the following findings. First, higher wages lead to lower quality experts. Second, an increase in transparency improves the quality of experts on the committee. Third, larger committees attract less able experts than smaller ones, unless the committee operates under full transparency. Fourth, we derive the properties of optimal committees. They involve low wages and can be transparent or opaque.

Keywords: committee decision-making, information aggregation, adverse selection, efficiency wages, transparency, career concerns

JEL Classification: D71, D82, J45

Suggested Citation

Hahn, Volker, Committee Design with Endogenous Participation (January 1, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2289095 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2289095

Volker Hahn (Contact Author)

University of Konstanz ( email )

Box 143
Konstanz, 78457
Germany

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