32 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2013 Last revised: 24 Jul 2013
Date Written: July 5, 2013
The aims of this essay are, first, to present the jurisprudential position that Ronald Dworkin set out in his penultimate book, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011); and, secondly, to elaborate it a little further than Dworkin himself was able to. The position is a distinctive and interesting one. Although Professor Dworkin argued in all his earlier work that moral facts (about rights and justice) were among the truth conditions of legal propositions, now in Justice for Hedgehogs he argued that law is itself a branch of morality. This is a bolder and more radical claim and it requires some quite careful exposition to see how it might be made plausible.
Keywords: Dworkin, law, legislation, morality, natural law, positivism, Raz, separation thesis
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Waldron, Jeremy, Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs (July 5, 2013). NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 13-45. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2290309 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2290309