Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs

32 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2013 Last revised: 24 Jul 2013

See all articles by Jeremy Waldron

Jeremy Waldron

New York University School of Law

Date Written: July 5, 2013

Abstract

The aims of this essay are, first, to present the jurisprudential position that Ronald Dworkin set out in his penultimate book, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011); and, secondly, to elaborate it a little further than Dworkin himself was able to. The position is a distinctive and interesting one. Although Professor Dworkin argued in all his earlier work that moral facts (about rights and justice) were among the truth conditions of legal propositions, now in Justice for Hedgehogs he argued that law is itself a branch of morality. This is a bolder and more radical claim and it requires some quite careful exposition to see how it might be made plausible.

Keywords: Dworkin, law, legislation, morality, natural law, positivism, Raz, separation thesis

Suggested Citation

Waldron, Jeremy, Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs (July 5, 2013). NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 13-45. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2290309 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2290309

Jeremy Waldron (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,490
Abstract Views
9,685
rank
11,631
PlumX Metrics