Election Fraud and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines

40 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2013

See all articles by Benjamin Crost

Benjamin Crost

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Joseph Felter

Stanford University

Hani Mansour

University of Colorado at Denver - Department of Economics

Daniel I. Rees

University of Colorado Denver; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract

Previous studies have documented a positive association between election fraud and the intensity of civil conflict. It is not clear, however, whether this association is causal or due to unobserved institutional or cultural factors. This paper examines the relationship between election fraud and post-election violence in the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections. Using the density test developed by McCrary (2008), we find evidence that incumbents were able to win tightly contested elections through fraud. In addition, we show that narrow incumbent victories were associated with an increase in post-election casualties, which is consistent with the hypothesis that election fraud causes conflict. We conduct several robustness tests and find no evidence that incumbent victories increased violence for reasons unrelated to fraud.

Keywords: election fraud, conflict

JEL Classification: D72, D73, D74

Suggested Citation

Crost, Benjamin and Felter, Joseph and Mansour, Hani and Rees, Daniel I., Election Fraud and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines. IZA Discussion Paper No. 7469, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2290467

Benjamin Crost (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

1301 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801
United States

Joseph Felter

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States

Hani Mansour

University of Colorado at Denver - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus Box 181
P.O. Box 173364
Denver, CO 80218
United States

Daniel I. Rees

University of Colorado Denver ( email )

Campus Box 181
P.O. Box 173364
Denver, CO 80218
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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