Choice and Matching

29 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2013 Last revised: 21 Nov 2014

See all articles by Christopher P. Chambers

Christopher P. Chambers

Georgetown University - Department of Economics

M. Bumin Yenmez

Boston College

Date Written: July 10, 2013


We study path-independent choice rules applied to a matching context. We use a classic representation of these choice rules to introduce a powerful technique for matching theory. Using this technique, we provide a deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and study its properties. Next, we obtain a compelling comparative static result: If one agent's choice expands, the remaining agents on her side of the market are made worse off, while agents on the other side of the market are made better off. We study the impact of firm mergers using this result.

A choice rule with a capacity that always binds whenever possible is deemed acceptant. We provide a constructive proof to show that every path-independent choice rule has an acceptant path-independent expansion with the same maximum cardinality. Finally, we characterize the class of responsive choice rules using acceptance.

Keywords: Two-Sided Matching, Choice Function, Acceptance, Path Independence, Stability

JEL Classification: C78, D47, D71, D78

Suggested Citation

Chambers, Christopher P. and Yenmez, M. Bumin, Choice and Matching (July 10, 2013). Available at SSRN: or

Christopher P. Chambers

Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

M. Bumin Yenmez (Contact Author)

Boston College ( email )

140 Commonwealth Ave.
Maloney Hall 327
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

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