Quantifying the Coordinated Effects of Partial Horizontal Acquisitions

66 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2013  

Duarte Brito

New University of Lisbon

Ricardo Ribeiro

Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Católica Porto Business School

Helder Vasconcelos

Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP)

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Date Written: July 2013

Abstract

The growth of private-equity investment strategies in which firms often hold partial ownership interests in competing firms has led competition agencies to take an increased interest in assessing the competitive effects of partial horizontal acquisitions. We propose a methodology to evaluate the coordinated effects of such acquisitions in differentiated products industries. The acquisitions may be direct and indirect, and may or not correspond to control. The methodology, that nests full mergers, evaluates the impact on the range of discount factors for which coordination can be sustained. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.

Keywords: Antitrust, Coordinated Effects, Demand Estimation, Differentiated Products, Oligopoly, Partial Acquisitions

JEL Classification: C54, D12, L13, L41, L66

Suggested Citation

Brito, Duarte and Ribeiro, Ricardo and Vasconcelos, Helder, Quantifying the Coordinated Effects of Partial Horizontal Acquisitions (July 2013). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9536. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2291337

Duarte Brito

New University of Lisbon ( email )

1099-085 Lisboa, 1099-085
Portugal

Ricardo Ribeiro

Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Católica Porto Business School ( email )

Rua Diogo Botelho, 1327
Porto, 4169-005
Portugal
+351-22619-6200 (Phone)
+351-22619-6291 (Fax)

Helder Vasconcelos

Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP) ( email )

Rua Dr. Roberto Frias
s/n
4200-464 Porto, 4200-464
Portugal

HOME PAGE: http://www.fep.up.pt/docentes/hvasconcelos

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