Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy

43 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2013

See all articles by Antonio Acconcia

Antonio Acconcia

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics

Giovanni Immordino

University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)

Salvatore Piccolo

University of Bergamo, Compass Lexecon and CSEF

Patrick Rey

Toulouse School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: July 2013

Abstract

We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved by the introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistently with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.

Keywords: Accomplice-witness, Criminal Organizations, Leniency, Whistleblowing

JEL Classification: K14, K42

Suggested Citation

Acconcia, Antonio and Immordino, Giovanni and Piccolo, Salvatore and Rey, Patrick, Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy (July 2013). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9543, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2291364

Antonio Acconcia (Contact Author)

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Cintia Monte S. Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Italy

Giovanni Immordino

University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

84084 Fisciano, Salerno
Italy

Salvatore Piccolo

University of Bergamo, Compass Lexecon and CSEF ( email )

via de caniana 2
24127
Bergamo, BG 24127
Italy

Patrick Rey

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

2 Rue du Doyen-Gabriel-Marty
Toulouse, 31042
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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