Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the Scope of Substantive Law

46 Texas Tech L. Rev. (2013), Forthcoming

University of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 35

21 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2013 Last revised: 8 Aug 2013

Carissa Byrne Hessick

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - School of Law

Judith M. Stinson

Arizona State University (ASU) - Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law

Date Written: June 7, 2013

Abstract

Substantive criminal law is an important factor in determining whether a juvenile will be tried as a juvenile or transferred to adult court. In particular, the gravity of the offense with which the juvenile is charged is a key component of most states’ discretionary waiver statutes, and it disproportionately influences judges when deciding whether to transfer juveniles. As a general matter, sex offenses are considered serious crimes. And a number of serious sex offenses are criminalized because of the victim’s age. These severe penalties reflect a policy determination on the part of legislatures that when sexual activity is illegal, either in whole or in part, because of the age of one of the participants — a category of crimes that we refer to as "age-determinative sex offenses" — participation in that activity is a serious crime.

The question we seek to answer in this Article is whether the justice system ought to distinguish between adult and juvenile offenders for these age-determinative sex offenses when assessing the seriousness or gravity of these crimes. We believe it should. In particular, this Article argues that, when the juvenile is in the same peer group as the victim — that is to say, the age difference between the victim and the offender is not large — substantive criminal law should recognize that an age-determinative sex offense is not nearly as serious as it would be if committed by an adult.

Keywords: sex offenses, juvenile offenders, juvenile justice, statutory rape, child pornography

Suggested Citation

Hessick, Carissa Byrne and Stinson, Judith M., Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the Scope of Substantive Law (June 7, 2013). 46 Texas Tech L. Rev. (2013), Forthcoming; University of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 35. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2292175

Carissa Byrne Hessick (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - School of Law ( email )

Van Hecke-Wettach Hall, 160 Ridge Road
CB #3380
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3380
United States

Judith M. Stinson

Arizona State University (ASU) - Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law ( email )

Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States

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