Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Article 102 TFEU in Contrast to § 2 Sherman Act

34 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2013  

Pierre Larouche

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); College of Europe - Bruges; Tilburg University - Tilburg Law School; Center on Regulation in Europe (CERRE)

Maarten Pieter Schinkel

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE); Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA)

Date Written: May 2013

Abstract

In this paper we compare the concepts of monopolization and abuse of dominance as in §2 of the Sherman Act and Article 102 of the TFEU, respectively. After identifying a number of distinctive features in wording and interpretation – including the special responsibility of the dominant firm, competition of the merits and protection of the competitive process – we discuss three lines of argument to explain these differences. The first builds on ordo-liberalism, with its concern for the absence of market power and for the resilience of competitive markets, which influenced EU competition law from the very beginning. The second line of argument derives from the observation that public competition law enforcement is fallible, which self-enforcement could remedy. The third argument explains some of these differences via innovation, whereby Article 102 would reflect a European perspective on innovation. We subsequently return to the underutilized EU category of exploitative abuses and argue that economic techniques developed in the context of damages litigation could open it up for future enforcement in a way that would be in line with ordo-liberal principles, properly understood.

Keywords: monopolization, abuse of dominance, ordo-liberalism, error-risk analysis

JEL Classification: B150, K210, L410

Suggested Citation

Larouche, Pierre and Schinkel, Maarten Pieter, Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Article 102 TFEU in Contrast to § 2 Sherman Act (May 2013). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2013-020. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2293141 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2293141

Pierre Larouche (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Montesquieu Building, Room M 535
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31.13.466.8270 (Phone)

College of Europe - Bruges ( email )

Dijver 11
B-8000 Brugge, Oost Vlanderen 10000
Belgium

Tilburg University - Tilburg Law School ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Montesquieu Building, Room M 535
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31.13.466.8270 (Phone)

Center on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) ( email )

Rue de l'Industrie 42
Brussels, 1040
Belgium

Maarten Pieter Schinkel

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
1018 WB Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 525 7132 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5318 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA) ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

Paper statistics

Downloads
535
Rank
40,555
Abstract Views
3,220