Inside Liquidity in Competitive Markets
32 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2013
Date Written: June 25, 2013
We study incentives of banks to reserve liquidity given that they can rely on the interbank market to mitigate crisis-related liquidity shocks. Banks can partially pledge their assets to each other, but not to the rest of the economy. Therefore liquidity provision is endogenous. We show that if the probability of a crisis is large or if assets are slightly pledgeable, then all banks reserve liquidity. However, if the probability of a crisis is small or if assets are highly pledgeable, then banks segregate ex ante: some reserve no liquidity, others reserve to the maximum and become liquidity providers. Minimum liquidity requirements improve banks' prots only in the symmetric equilibrium. A marginal central bank intervention aimed at lowering the interest rate causes a marginal crowding-out of private liquidity with public liquidity in the symmetric equilibrium, and a full crowding-out in the asymmetric equilibrium.
Keywords: inside liquidity, partial pledgeability, interbank markets
JEL Classification: E43, G20, G33
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