The Social and Ecological Determinants of Common Pool Resource Sustainability

61 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2013 Last revised: 20 May 2015

See all articles by Erik O. Kimbrough

Erik O. Kimbrough

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics

Alexander Vostroknutov

University of Trento

Date Written: April 10, 2015

Abstract

We study a dynamic common pool resource game in which current resource stock depends on resource extraction in the previous period. Our model shows that for a sufficiently high regrowth rate, there is no commons dilemma: the resource will be preserved indefinitely in equilibrium. Lower growth rates lead to depletion. Laboratory tests of the model indicate that favorable ecological characteristics are necessary but insufficient to encourage effective CPR governance. Before the game, we elicit individual willingness to follow a costly rule. Only the presence of enough rule-followers preserves the resource given favorable ecological conditions.

Keywords: cooperation, common pool resource game, rule-following, experimental economics

JEL Classification: C9, C7, D7

Suggested Citation

Kimbrough, Erik O. and Vostroknutov, Alexander, The Social and Ecological Determinants of Common Pool Resource Sustainability (April 10, 2015). Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 73, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2293172 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2293172

Erik O. Kimbrough (Contact Author)

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics ( email )

One University Dr
Orange, CA 92866
United States

Alexander Vostroknutov

University of Trento ( email )

Via Giuseppe Verdi 26
Trento, Trento 38152
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.vostroknutov.com

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