Regulatory Networks: Power, Legitimacy, and Compliance

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack, eds.) Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming

22 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2013

See all articles by Abraham Newman

Abraham Newman

Georgetown University

David T. Zaring

University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department

Date Written: July 14, 2013

Abstract

This paper offers a scholarly review of the international relations and international law literature on regulatory networks. Although generalizations are necessarily imprecise, we suggest that the international relations oeuvre has proved particularly attentive to the way that power is wielded within these networks. International law scholars have focused more on the description of networks and considerations of their legitimacy. We suggest that, although the literatures have diverged, future work may be ripe for reintegration, as both IL and IR scholars increasingly turn their attention to the same issue: compliance with network mandates. Thus, we present a collaborative research agenda on regulatory networks highlighting issues of participation, authority resources, regime complexity, and interdependent implementation, which we hope will be of interests to scholars from both fields.

Suggested Citation

Newman, Abraham and Zaring, David T., Regulatory Networks: Power, Legitimacy, and Compliance (July 14, 2013). Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack, eds.) Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2293580

Abraham Newman

Georgetown University ( email )

ICC 501
Washington, DC 20057
United States

David T. Zaring (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department ( email )

3730 Walnut Street
Suite 600
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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